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National parliaments have often been described as latecomers to European integration, but there is little doubt that 
they have developed the institutional means to become more involved over the last years – and especially since the 
Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, the main focus of the literature has been on this institutional adaptation and thus on the 
relationship between the parliament and the government in EU affairs. Other parliamentary functions, and in 
particular those that relate to their citizens such as the communication function, in contrast, have been largely 
neglected. Yet democracy depends on a viable public debate on policy choices and political alternatives to allow 
citizens to make informed political (electoral) choices and to exercise democratic control. This collection therefore 
investigates whether, and how, individual MPs, political parties, or legislatures as institutions ‘link’ with their 
electorates in EU politics. In this introduction, we discuss why engaging with the public in EU affairs is – or at least 
should be – an important aspect of parliamentary work, we introduce parliamentary means of communication and 
assess parliamentary incentives and disincentives ‘to go public’ in EU politics.  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Introduction  
The role of national legislatures in the political system of the European Union (EU) first received serious 
political and academic attention in the mid-1990s in connection with debates on how to cure the EU’s 
democratic deficit.1 Academic interest in the topic drew further inspiration from the first comparative 
projects that showed domestic legislatures to be largely ineffective or uninterested in controlling their 
governments in EU matters (among many: Laursen & Pappas, 1995; Norton, 1996). Since then, the role of 
national parliaments has featured quite prominently on the research agenda of both parliamentary and EU 
scholars, with several comparative research projects on national parliamentary scrutiny of EU policies 
completed during the first decade of the new millennium (Auel & Benz, 2005; Barrett, 2008; Maurer & 
Wessels, 2001; O´Brennan & Raunio, 2007; Tans, Zoethout, & Peters, 2007). 
 
Thanks to this lively academic debate, we are now in a much better position to evaluate the ways in which 
national legislatures are affected by and get involved in European politics. While national parliaments have 
certainly been late adapters to integration, there is no doubt that they can exercise tighter scrutiny of their 
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governments over EU matters than before. However, practically all existing research has focused on 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs and emphasized institutional provisions. Interestingly, this 
preoccupation with government-related functions in EU politics can also be found among national MPs. As 
Raunio (2011) has shown, the debate in the Convention on the Future of Europe, for example, centred almost 
exclusively on issues of government scrutiny and compliance with subsidiarity principle. Even COSAC2, 
which has a basically unconstrained agenda and can discuss any issue it chooses, has so far focused mainly 
on different aspects of parliamentary scrutiny and, more recently, on the subsidiarity control mechanism. 
 
In contrast, linkages between legislatures and citizens, and the parliamentary information and 
communication functions in EU affairs in particular, have been largely neglected. Within legislative studies, 
there are a number of publications that deal with the relationships between parliaments and their citizens (for 
example, Leston-Bandeira, 2012; Marschall, 1999, 2009; Norton, 1997, 2002). This neglect of parliamentary 
communication in EU affairs is rather surprising given that the opacity of policy-making processes and the 
lack of accountability have been defined as core problems in both academic and political debates on the 
democratic deficit of the EU (for example, Harlow, 2002; Curtin, Mair, &	Papadopoulos, 2010). So far, 
much of this debate focuses purely on the European level, but the demand that EU policy problems, solutions 
and alternatives are debated in public and that decision-makers be publicly held accountable for their 
decisions to allow citizens to exercise control are fundamental pre-conditions for the legitimacy of domestic 
EU policy-making and thus the EU as a whole. Here, it has been argued that national parliaments are in a 
unique position to ensure that people are more connected with ‘Europe’ by making the EU more visibly 
present in national politics and more accessible to and for their national public (Auel, 2007). The expectation 
is that this will increase the democratic quality of EU governance, because it will give citizens greater 
awareness of and ownership over European decisions. In the short run, this may lead to a brake on further 
integration, but in the long run a more open debate could create a basis for a more democratic Union (de 
Wilde, 2009). 
 
Given the lack of (comparative) empirical studies on how parliaments fulfil their information and 
communication functions in EU affairs, however, we are hardly in a position to assess to what degree 
parliaments actually do serve as channels between the EU and citizens. In fact, we know very little about 
whether and how individual MPs, political parties, or legislatures as institutions ‘link’ with their electorates 
in EU affairs. Do parliaments inform the public about European matters? Are EU issues debated in plenary 
and are these debates covered by the media? Do MPs and political parties use publicly accessible control 
mechanisms like parliamentary questions in EU matters? Do political parties and their parliamentary groups 
have specific mechanisms for interacting with their supporters in EU affairs? It may thus be true that 
‘parliaments provide a major space for public debate and are thus the ideal arenas for the deliberation of 
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important European issues and their national implications’ (Auel, 2007, p. 498), but whether they actually do 
so remains largely unknown.  
 
The objective of this volume is to provide first and (necessarily) preliminary answers to these important and 
until now unanswered questions. The next section of this introductory article introduces parliamentary means 
of communication and discusses parliamentary incentives and disincentives ‘to go public’ in EU politics. 
The second section outlines the structure and results of this volume. 
 
Parliamentary Communication in EU Affairs: Means and (Dis)Incentives 
The general research question of this volume is whether and how national parliaments communicate EU 
affairs. Communication is a two-way process that entails not only providing information, explanations and 
justifications, but also listening to others. The communication function of national parliaments is thus 
something of an umbrella term for a number of parliamentary functions. The classic catalogue of 
parliamentary functions by Walter Bagehot (2001 [1867], pp. 99-102), for example, distinguishes between 
an informing function (‘it makes us hear what otherwise we should not’), a teaching function (‘to alter 
[society] for the better [by teaching] the nation what it does not know’), and a broader expressive function 
(‘to express the mind of the English people on all matters which come before it’), which necessarily includes 
the element of listening as a precondition to know what the mind of the people actually is.  
 
It has been argued that the communication function is best achieved through frequent personal contact 
between the representatives and the represented (Fenno, 1978). In the short run, the argument goes, such 
close contact means that the representative hears about opinions and views first hand and can directly 
respond to them. In the long run, the expectation is that such personal contacts will build trust. However, 
people are not only hard to find (Fenno, 1978, p. 234) but there are also so very many of them. Thus, in 
practice representative democracy means mainly indirect communication, with representatives who voice 
citizens’ interests on their behalf. Democratic political representation is realised through an ‘activation of the 
communicative current’ (Urbinati, 2006, p. 24) through continuous communication on, and the constant 
‘making present’ of the represented in, choices over public policies.Within the parliamentary arena, such 
communication takes place between different parliamentary parties. Parliaments are thus the ‘means by 
which the measures and actions of government are debated and scrutinised on behalf of citizens, and through 
which the concerns of citizens … may be voiced. The extent to which they carry out such actions, and are 
seen by citizens to carry out such actions, may be argued to constitute the essential underpinning of 
legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of electors’ (Norton, 1998, p. 1, emphasis added). The 
following provides an overview of the most important means that parliaments have to provide information 
and to communicate EU issues to their citizens.  
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Plenary Debates 
Plenary debates are among the most important instruments of parliaments to fulfil their communication 
function. Plenary debates may provide an effective forum for both articulating and representing societal 
interests and informing the electorate about issues on the political agenda. Although it is questionable 
whether citizens actually follow plenary debates, at the very least such debates provide the electorate with 
the opportunity to learn about what is on the agenda of European politics and what the positions of parties 
are in these matters – particularly if the debates are covered by the media. Information and accountability 
can, of course, be obscured by strategies of ‘blame shifting’ and ‘credit claiming’ (Lord & Pollak, 2010, p. 
977f.). But parliamentary debates provide the means by which the justifications of some (government or 
governing parties) can be continuously challenged by others within (the opposition) and outside of the 
parliamentary arena (media, interest groups and so on) and thus be exposed to the ‘best of disinfectants, 
sunshine’ (Brandeis, 1913, p. 11). 
 
Transparency in Parliamentary Committees 
Whether committees meet in public can have a major impact on the ability of the electorate to follow 
parliamentary work. Despite significant cross-national variation, the handling of EU affairs has gradually 
become more transparent and public in national parliaments. According to COSAC (2009), in around half of 
the lower houses of national parliaments (14/27) the European Affairs Committees (EAC) meet in public. 
However, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between public and private EAC meetings. The main problem is 
that some do sit in camera, but publish the minutes on the web afterwards or allow the press to be present 
(for example, Cyprus, Estonia, France and Spain). This means that information on the proceedings is 
basically public, even if the actual meetings are not. One could even argue that providing minutesor streams 
on the web may be more important as it provides regular information to a larger audience than attendance at 
meetings, which is necessarily limited. In turn, most EACs have the option to either close part of their 
otherwise public meetings (such restrictive practices being normally used in connection with more sensitive 
EU matters, for instance, security policy, or perhaps when the minister appears in the committee before a 
council meeting).  
 
Parliamentary Questions 
While there is variation with respect to the openness of committees, parliamentary questions are accessible to 
the public throughout the EU. Parliamentary questions are particularly interesting as they are multi-
functional, and MPs ask questions for several reasons. Among the most important of these are asking for 
information, committing the government to making a public formal statement and pressing it for action, 
defending constituency interests, and informing the policy-makers of problems they might be unfamiliar 
with. The attractiveness of parliamentary questions is enhanced by the fact that MPs or parliamentary party 
groups can practically raise any issue they want. ‘Parliamentary question time’ also seems to gain more 
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attention in the media than other parliamentary activities (Salmond, 2013).Parliamentary questions are used 
in every EU national legislature, but there is variation between the parliaments regarding both the types of 
questions used and the procedural details concerning the submission and answering of questions (Russo 
&Wiberg, 2010; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003). 
 
Informing the Electorate  
One of the classic functions of parliaments is that of informing the public about political matters. Citizens 
can obviously learn about policy issues through all of the other above-mentioned means of parliamentary 
communication. Here, however, we refer specifically to means of making information and documents 
available to the public. Parliaments as institutions can provide information about the EU to the electorate, for 
example online or through their information offices. This can include original EU documents, documents 
produced by the national government or by parliaments themselves – such as stenographic minutes, opinions 
or reports of the EACs – but also information on European institutions, policies and procedures or the 
involvement of parliament in EU politics more generally. In addition, political parties and MPs can provide 
information through the media, especially the social media, by emphasising European policies in their 
programmes or through more direct means such as party events or public talks.  
 
Is Anyone Listening? The Importance of Media Coverage 
Finally, any discussion of parliamentary communication remains incomplete without the distinction between 
two kinds of openness of a political system: transparency and publicity (Hüller, 2007). While transparency 
requires that information is publicly available, publicity is only achieved if citizens are actually aware of the 
information. While parliamentary information and communication can, of course, be directly accessed via 
the various means discussed above, citizens experience politics primarily indirectly through the media. This 
raises the question to what extent the national media consider parliamentary activities in EU affairs 
newsworthy. Due to the ‘digitalization of traditional media spheres and the practices of publishing, sharing 
and commenting political news online’ (Michailidou & Trenz, 2013, p. 262), parliaments have to compete 
for media attention in an increasingly unpredictable and fluid public arena. Since the seminal study of 
Galtung and Ruge, (1965), news value research has identified a variety of factors impacting news selection 
that is too broad to be discussed here in detail (for an overview see O’Neill & Harcup, 2009). However, a 
plausible hypothesis based on this research is that media coverage in general depends both on the salience of 
‘Europe’ in the country (though not necessarily the degree of Euroscepticism, see Brüggemann & Kleinen-
von Königslöw, 2009) and on the level of party competition over Europe – the more fiercely parties, and 
their prominent (famous) MPs in particular, fight (entertainingly) over the EU, the more the media should 
cover parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
 
(Dis)Incentives for Going ‘Public’ in EU Affairs 
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While parliamentary information and communication is easily demanded and justified, the question remains: 
what are the incentives for MPs and political parties to do so in EU affairs? Considering that re-election is 
the primary goal of most MPs and their parties, we expect them to have greater incentives to engage publicly 
with EU affairs in member states where EU issues are more salient and public opinion is generally more 
critical of EU integration (Raunio, 2005; Saalfeld, 2005). This will signal to the voters that they are doing 
their job of representing voter interests and of controlling the government in EU politics. Where, in contrast, 
European affairs play no role in voting decisions or where the permissive consensus prevails, there are far 
fewer electoral benefits to be gained from investing in public activities.   
 
Second, MPs will engage in public activities if they expect a payoff in terms of policy influence and control. 
Indeed, parliamentary resolutions and mandates may have a greater impact on the government’s negotiation 
position if made publicly, because this will make it more difficult for the government to ignore or circumvent 
them in the Council negotiations (for example through abstentions). In addition, publicity strengthens 
parliamentary control through debates or questions. While critical questioning behind closed doors may be 
unpleasant for ministers, having to defend their European policies in public is much more uncomfortable due 
to the potential negative publicity and public embarrassment. To what extent especially governing parties 
and MPs make use of these advantages will also depend on how much they trust the government to represent 
their policy preferences in EU negotiations (Saalfeld, 2003). This trust can be assumed to be greatest in the 
case of single-party governments. Although governing party MPs and ministers may not agree on every 
single issue, we can expect their interests to be fairly similar – unless the party is deeply internally divided 
over the EU. Divergent preferences and thus less trust, however, can be expected for coalition governments. 
Here, coalition partners not only have to negotiate compromises, but they also have a stronger incentive to 
control the other coalition partners’ members of government publicly. Trust can finally be considered lowest 
in the case of minority governments that cannot rely on the trust and support of a loyal majority in 
parliament. 
 
However, there are also a number of reasons why parties and MPs may generally prefer to conduct their EU 
business away from the prying eyes of the public. Negotiations between government and parliament (and 
especially between the cabinet and its party groups) are clearly facilitated by closed doors. The establishment 
of EACs reduces the use of plenary, as the former coordinate parliamentary work in EU matters and are 
often authorised to speak on behalf of the whole parliament in these issues. While MPs may defend 
committee deliberations behind closed doors with the need to further national interests and to allow 
confidential exchange of views between government and parliament, this mechanism clearly also serves the 
interests of the mainstream parties. Governing parties in particular may want to monitor the government 
behind closed doors without public criticism that might damage the reputation of the cabinet (Auel, 2007). 
Indeed, main parties in several EU countries, especially in the Nordic region, have deliberately ‘de-
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politicised’ European integration through cross-party cooperation in the EAC with the aim of manufacturing 
consensus in national integration policy (Bergman & Damgaard, 2000). 
 
In addition, focusing on EU matters may not be a very attractive option for most parties or MPs from an 
electoral perspective either. In terms of re-election, specific EU policies can be important for their 
constituencies (for example, in terms of attracting regional policy funds), but not necessarily for the voters in 
general, who still base their voting choices primarily on domestic issues.3 What is more, for many parties the 
costs of engaging in public activities on Europe may even outweigh any potential benefits. Regardless of the 
data used, there is a consistent body of work showing that national mainstream parties across the EU are 
ideologically less cohesive on integration than in traditional socio-economic issues that dominate domestic 
political discourse (for example, Hooghe & Marks, 2007; Marks & Steenbergen, 2004). Thus, the issue of 
European integration may threaten the internal cohesiveness of political parties, and party leaders may be 
reluctant to emphasise an issue that threatens to divide their party since disunity may reduce a party’s 
electoral popularity. Despite intra-party dissent, mainstream parties are also generally more supportive of 
integration than their voters (Mattila & Raunio, 2012), and this can impact negatively on their vote shares in 
elections (Hobolt, Spoon, & Tilley, 2009). For mainstream parties, EU issue voting is thus often more of a 
liability than an asset (De Vries, 2010) and avoiding public activities related to EU affairs may therefore be a 
logical response from parties aiming at electoral success.  
 
Overview of this Volume 
Overall, the contributions in this volume paint a rather sobering picture of parliamentary communication in 
EU affairs. Especially in the plenary, Europe seems a rare guest. The contribution by Katrin Auel and Tapio 
Raunio investigates how institutional and party-related factors impact the level and nature of parliamentary 
debates in four national parliaments. It shows that EU issues,especially normal policy matters rather than 
‘high politics’ questions, were rarely debated in the British House of Commons or the French Assemblée 
Nationale between 2002 and 2010. In the Finnish Eduskunta, which is regarded as one of the most powerful 
and active parliaments in the EU, they found literally only a handful of plenary debates. A relatively positive 
example, in contrast, is the German Bundestag, where over 20 per cent of all plenary sessions included an 
EU topic. Since 2010, however, they do observe an increase (partly steep) in parliamentary debates, which is 
mainly due to the euro crisis. 
 
The article by Fabio García Lupato, in turn, investigates the overall salience of Europe and its usage by 
national parties in parliamentary budget and investiture debates in Italy and Spain between 1986 and 2006. It 
shows how both ideology and government-opposition dynamics affect the discourse of parties, with 
governing parties defending the EU and using it to legitimate their programmes and budgetary decisions, 
while opposition to Europe comes mainly from smaller and ideologically radical parties. Yet while he 
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observed a slowly growing politicisation of EU issues in Italy, the overall party consensus on EU matters in 
both Spain and Italy implies that there are no real debates on European issues. In addition, especially in 
budgetary debates, the EU is often seen or portrayed as an external constraint, which contributes to the de-
politicisation of national politics.  
 
The article by Pieter de Wilde assesses the explanatory power of European integration theory for the 
politicisation of the EU in mass media and national parliaments. By comparing debates on the EU budget in 
newspapers and in parliamentary plenary sessions in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, it investigates 
how visible the EU is, who communicates and how sense is made of EU issues. De Wilde shows that the 
politicisation of EU budget differs mostly between mass media and parliaments, rather than across countries 
or over time. While the visibility of EU issues has risen in both arenas, corresponding to the increased 
powers of the Union, different institutional operating logics explain best which actors dominate the debates 
and how EU issues are framed. Italso suggests that regardless of the extent to which parliaments perform 
their communicative role, parliamentary communication is very rarely reported by the media: the extent to 
which parliaments publicly debate EU affairs, and thus ‘transparency’, only marginally affects the ‘publicity’ 
in the sense of reaching mass audiences through media coverage.  
 
Rik de Ruiter’s contribution investigates aspects of parliamentary communication with regard to policy 
issues integrated under the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). OMC often deals with policy issues that 
are highly relevant from an electoral point of view, such as employment or social policy. At the same time, 
the OMC’s benchmarking processes provide national parliaments with important information to monitor and 
assess their government’s policies. De Ruiter found that British and Dutch opposition MPs do use OMC 
reports to criticise or shame the government for its policy choices, but they do so mainly through questions 
in committees, while shaming activities in the plenary are rare. As a result, OMC-related activities received 
little attention from newspapers, and the link established between the citizens and OMCs through the 
communicative function of national parliaments is weak. 
 
The contribution by Eric Miklin therefore argues that domestic politicisation of Europe may require 
European policy proposals that polarise centre-left and centre-right parties. By changing the incentive 
structure of national parties, such proposals could help to overcome parties’ reluctance to publicly discuss 
European issues and hence provide citizens with electoral alternatives in EU decision-making. Examining 
the parliamentary processing of the Services Directive in Austria and Germany, Miklin also shows how the 
higher salience of polarising proposals can induce national parliaments to pay more attention to the proposal, 
resulting in tighter scrutiny of the government. This reduces the risk of agency losses in Council decision-
making, with ministers better aligned to the preferences of their parliamentary principals.  
 
9	
	
Julien Navarro and Sylvain Brouard explore the Europeanisation of parliamentary questions in the French 
National Assembly (1988-2007). While the overall share of EU-related questions is very low, parliamentary 
attention for EU issues has slowly increased over time, but still focuses mainly on the ‘big issues’ such as 
treaty negotiations or the French EU presidency. Navarro and Brouard find variation mainly between the 
types of questions under consideration.Written questions relating to EU issues, which are deemed technical, 
are most closely related to a genuine interest in European politics, and politicians with strong pro- or anti-
European views tend to ask more such questions than their colleagues. Oral questions, the most visible to the 
voters, are submitted in relation to local district concerns, even in the case of questions dealing with 
European issues: they serve more direct electoral purposes. Questions to the government, finally, are mainly 
used by MPs of cabinet parties to scrutinise their government, especially when the minister in charge comes 
from a different party within the coalition. In contrast, positions on the EU or government-opposition 
dynamics seem to play an overall smaller role: Eurosceptic and opposition deputies were no more likely to 
ask EU-related questions than pro-European and governing party MPs. 
 
Focusing on three consecutive treaty revisions (Nice Treaty, draft Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty), 
the contribution by Johannes Pollak and Peter Slominski investigates a broader supply side of political 
communication by analysing whether and how various information tools such as press releases, organising 
events and public debates, as well as recent forms of web-based tools such as websites or blogs, have been 
used to inform citizens about these important EU issues.The results are again discouraging: neither does the 
parliament as an institution make any specific efforts to link the supranational level with the national 
electorate, nor do the parliamentary party groups engage in communicating over Europe beyond press 
releases. Even individual MPs are reluctant to communicate with their constituents over Europe, since it is an 
activity not rewarded either by their party organisation or by voters. Taken together, all communication 
efforts are top-down in character and do not aim at any deliberative engagement with the citizens. 
 
The final contribution by Jürgen Neyer addresses fundamental questions about democracy and the 
appropriate role of national parliaments raised by the multi-level nature of EU governance. Given the serious 
problems individual domestic legislatures face in controlling their governments in European affairs, his 
contribution highlights the importance of parliaments becoming key mediating institutions between 
European citizens and EU decision-making. Drawing on a concept of legitimacy that centres on the idea of 
justification, Neyer suggests that national parliaments become more actively involved in the European 
constitutional process. Such a role could be achieved through transforming COSAC into an Inter-
parliamentary Constitutional Assembly responsible for treaty revisions.  
 
To conclude, the studies in this collection clearly suggest that so far most parliaments seem not to live up to 
their task of bringing ‘Europe’ closer to the citizens or enabling them to make informed political choices and 
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to exercise democratic control in EU affairs.Stronger scrutiny rights and procedures in EU affairs have 
certainly raised parliamentary awareness of European issues. Parliaments have overall also become better at 
controlling and influencing their governments in EU politics. However, as long as such scrutiny or 
participation takes place mainly in the EAC and other standing committees, the impact in terms of 
democratic legitimacy remains limited. Given the low public profile of EU politics in most parliaments, 
domestic actors involved in EU politics remain fairly untroubled by public parliamentary accountability to 
their citizens. It should be noted, however, that with the exception of the contributions by Auel and Raunio 
as well as Pollak and Slominski, the data for the contributions in this collection dates from before the 
outbreak of the euro crisis. To what extent the euro crisis has changed these dynamics is thus not entirely 
clear. As the contribution by Auel and Raunio shows, we can observe an increase in plenary debates on EU 
issues over the last few years, which is at least partly due to the euro crisis. Similarly, Pollak & Slominski 
indicate that especially the right wing parliamentary party groups initiated debates on the euro crisis in 
Austria. Whether this politicisation will last, however, and spill over into other aspects of European politics, 
is at least doubtful. So far, national parliaments, and the parties acting within them, fail to keep their 
‘promise of communication’. 
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Notes 
																																								 																				
1 For excellent overviews of the literature see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2008), Raunio (2009) and Winzen (2010). 
2 The Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union,a 
parliamentary conference at the EU level consisting of members of European Affairs Committees of national 
parliaments and members of the European Parliament. 
3 For example, in her case study on the Danish scrutiny system, Møller Sousa (2008, p. 441) shows how the incentive 
structure works against more active involvement in European affairs, with the MPs feeling that neither the media nor 
the voters are interested in EU matters.  
